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ABSTRACI
Air France has consistently opposed European liberalization. This has prevented it
from adapting itself to the new environment, while its main competitors, British Airways
and Lufthansa, have already started to turn into more cost effective carriers. This fact puts
Air France at a big disadvantage.
The likely outcomes from the European liberalization can be deduced from those of
the American deregulation. Despite differences between the two markets, the three basic
changes will occur towards:
* a more market oriented type of service
· lower costs
· a reorganization of the industry
A revolution has been necessary for most of airlines to adapt themselves to the new
regulatory order. Those which have not gone through such a radical change have ceased to
operate (Pan Am, Eastern) or have been tremendously scaled down (TWA). Others have
emerged as the new leaders (American Airlines, Delta...) In Europe, British Airways has
taken an advantage on all the other airlines. Lufthansa is moving in the same direction.
Air France however is virtually bankrupt. It needs to go through a very deep
process of change, similar to the one experienced in the eighties by British Airways. This
would involve:
* a change in corporate culture, switching from a world of technicians to a world of
sellers and managers
* extreme cost consciousness - specially focusing on labor cost -
* complete integration of Air Inter, loosing Air Inter's goodwill but gaining a lot in
efficiency
* operation of a hub and spoke system in Europe, taking full advantage of CDG possible
extensions
* building a long term commitment with both a US carrier and an Asian carrier.
Air France is in an extremely bad position. It should take advantage of this
situation to take all the necessary measures that the industry in all will have to take one day
or another. It should remember this quotation from Montaigne: "Faute de changer les
evenements, change toi toi-meme" ("For lack of changing the events, change yourself").
Thesis Advisor: Richard de Neufville
Tide: Chairman, MIT Technology and Policy Program
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Introduction
Air France is in the midst of political and economical changes. The new regulatory
environment and industry structure lead to much fiercer competition. Air France's main
competitors - British Airways, Lufthansa and the US carriers on the North Atlantic market-
have significantly improved their efficiency, both decreasing their costs and adopting a
consumer oriented approach. In 1993, Air France experienced a net loss of more than $1.2
billion, went through one of the harshest strikes in its history and has not yet really begun
the process towards becoming a much more efficient air carrier. Urgent measures have to
be undertaken. These measures should not only be remedial or aim to catch up with the
competition. On the contrary, Air France should try to overtake its competitors by adopting
now the necessary measures that will have to be taken by the whole industry sooner or
later.
This thesis does not judge the European liberalization, nor ask for an acceleration or
a deceleration of its process. It does not judge the "Comit6 des Sages" report (Expanding
the Horizons, 1994). It simply notes that the European liberalization is happening now and
that roll-backs are unlikely. Air France should therefore be prepared to the new
environment and to the expected competition.
This thesis aims to provide some few basic points that will have to be tackled by Air
France. It tries to avoid excessive details that usually prevent from seeing the global
picture. "Air France essentially suffers from two drawbacks: a too diverse fleet and a
schedule that poorly makes use of the aircraft and the crew members." (Le Figaro, March
15, 1994). This thesis challenges this view, saying that these disadvantages are real but
minor compared to deep impediments such as:
* obsolete corporate culture
* lack of consistent and aggressive strategy
* higher costs than competitors
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Chapter I outlines the overall results of the American deregulation, putting the
emphasis on the general concepts rather than the details of each company. No attempt has
been made to evaluate these effects in terms of consumer benefits1.
Chapter II focuses on the European scene. It anticipates the general outcomes of the
liberalization and argues that these will be similar to those in America even though the path
to get to them and their implementation will differ in detail.
The last Chapter provides recommendations for Air France. It states than Air
France should adopt a strong and aggressive strategy rather move reluctantly on its way to
decrease its costs. It should also adopt a much more market-oriented strategy as well as a
global approach.
To support these short chapters, eight annexes have been added. They need to be
read only by readers lacking knowledge in one or more aspects of the subject. Annexes 1,
2, and 3 give an outlook of the air transport industry as well as the origin of the American
deregulation, they could be conveniently read before the first chapter. Annexes 4, 5 and 6
present the European market and its liberalization and can be appropriately read before
chapter II. Finally, annexes 7 and 8 deal with the French market and a general presentation
of the Air France group and are therefore a pre-requisite for chapter mII.
1 An interested reader would like to see Winston and Morrison (1992) or Dempsey and Goetz (1992) for two
divergent points of view on the subject (see also ANNEX 3 for a short story of it).
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Chapter I. Lessons Gained from the American Deregulation
The American deregulation is a convenient starting point to study the effects of
European liberalization. Firstly, it provides an interesting experience of the outcomes of
such a move in a similar, with limits, market. Secondly, the American deregulation gave
birth to highly efficient mega carriers, which compete in the North Atlantic market with the
European carriers. This, in turn, forces the European carriers to become as cost effective as
these carriers.
Most of the studies have been aimed at answering the basic question " Was the
deregulation a good move for the industry and the consumer or not ?" The point of this
study is not to try to compare the effects of the deregulation to the would-be state of the
industry had the deregulation not occurred. More important is to point out what have been
the basic consequences of the new competition. These consequences are likely to occur in
Europe too.
The consequences of the competition are fourfold:
· a change in the type of service offered
· a change in the price of this service
· a new technological tool
· a change in the structure of the industry
1.1 A Different Service Pattern
Due to the new competition and to the natural growth of the industry more and more
Americans have already taken the plane. Nobody is impressed any more by the
achievement of Icarus' dream. Travelers have become more rational and are not ready to
pay for a level of service that it is not entirely necessary for their trip. Some people may
find it unfortunate but air travel has been reduced to its primary goal: going from point A to
point B in the fastest time and in the cheapest way according to your comfort standards.
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The air transport industry has adapted itself to this new demand and has offered a
new wide range of services. Two important aspects of this change is the rising importance
of "no-frill services" -or Southwest-like type of services and the change in the route
structure to an hub and spoke type of network.
1.1 .1 No-Frill Services
This new concept is based on the reduction of the air transportation to its basic
utility, that is to carry passengers from one point to another. Everything else from checking
to meals or beverages is considered as frills. Throughout the eighties lot of new carriers
have experimented with this concept (People Express is one of the most famous
examples). However, few have succeeded. The main reason for that is that these new
entrants could not sustain their price long enough. They were matched by the major carriers
and their cost advantage was not sufficient to enable them to compete effectively. On the
other hand Southwest has achieved such a cost competitive advantage that it can sustain its
extremely low prices long enough to hurt the major carriers. These low prices have also
generated a new demand.
No frill services have played a minor role, in terms of market share, up to now.
However, they are believed to have a significant importance as more carriers follow
Southwest's path and begin to offer Southwest-like type of services such Continental with
its new subsidiary Cal-Lite. Southwest accounts now for 8% of US domestic boarding
(Feldman 1994).
1.1.2. Route Structure
The change from point to point services to hubs and spokes was accompanied by an
increasing hub concentration and quite paradoxically an increasing competition in the non-
stop OD markets. Hub and spoke systems are challenged by Southwest, which takes
advantage of their drawbacks. However they remain the main type of service and their
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advantages offset their incremental costs (PRC Aviation, 1993). Their obvious advantage
is that they enable to serve more OD markets than point to point services would do. They
enable flights between two small towns that would not justify a direct service. It also
permits major carriers to feed their inter-continental flights. On the other hand their main
drawback is airport congestion during a few short periods of time during the day,
rendering the ground handling equipment and staff inefficient.
1.2 A Change in Cost / Price
1.2.1 Cost Structure
"Labor costs were about 35% of the total 1992 operating expenses of American Airlines,
Delta airlines, United Airlines, and USAir - the Big Four. Of an airline's controllable
operating costs, however, labor accounts for about 60-65%." (Velocci, 1993). Competition
has obliged the airlines to try to reduce their costs and their efforts have concentrated on
the labor costs. Labor costs used to be very much higher in the US for several reasons:
* operating airlines was regarded as a highly qualified job (flight attendants were at the
beginning registered nurses )
* a premium was added for the risk involved in the job
* another premium was added for the fanciness of the job (the people that fly...)
* very advantageous work rules were put in place to be sure that pilots rest sufficiently
between flights...
* regulation enabled wages to increase with no market sanction.
However with the increasing traffic and the generalization of the air transport, none
of these justifications are still valid:
· operating an airline although still a qualified job appears not to be more complicated
than qualified workers managing highly computerized machines
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· the risk has been lowered to a level that it is safer to pilot an airline than to drive a truck
(truck drivers are not paid that much)
* air transport has become much more common
* competition condemns cumbersome work rules
Labor costs have decreased through its two main items, wages and benefits, and
labor productivity. Although productivity can be obtained gradually, deep cut in the payroll
seems to be the most easily feasible through bankruptcy , as Continental and TWA did.
Table 1.1 and 1.2 show the difference between American Airlines still embedded in
its old cost structure, and Continental with much lower wages and Southwest with a much
higher productivity:
Table 1.1: Gross Pay in 1992 US $ for an American and Continental Employee in each
labor group with eight years seniority.
Jobs American Continental % Higher than CO
Pilots 146,766 79,752 84.0%
Flight Attendants 24,081 21,445 12.3%
Line Mechanics 49,51 5 35,706 38.7%
Fleet Service Clerks 30,81 9 23,437 31.5%
Reservation Agents 28,786 17,281 66.6%
Airport Agents 29,067 20,086 44.7%
Source: PRC Aviation (1993)
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Table 1.2: Pilot's Productivity at Southwest and American Airline
Pilot Productivity
4 At
1 UU
0
E 80
' 60
0
2
0
American Southwest
3 Contract Pay Cap
E: Pay for Non Flying
El Average Block Hours Flown
Source: PRC Aviation (1993)
1.2.2 Prices
Cost structures are therefore very different from one airline to another. The cheapest
airlines impose the lowest prices on the market forcing, in turn, the largest more expensive
airlines to cut their costs. This downward spiral benefits the consumer but terribly
endangers airline profitability. Bob Crandall, CEO of American Airline, is reported to have
said "This industry is always in the hand of its dumbest competitors". Maybe not dumbest
but cheapest for sure.
1.3 Computerization of the Management Systems
The most recent technological development of the air transport industry is rather
intangible. Big steps have been made in the past with the introduction of jet engines and
then wide body aircraft, those steps were highly visible and therefore adopted by the major
carriers rapidly. The eighties have not witnessed such a move in the hardware, however the
software -the tools to manage those aircraft - have changed dramatically. Deregulation has
created an incentive to optimize one's revenue by an adequate pricing. This pricing has in
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turn forced the airlines to manage carefully a seat inventory system and thus improved their
reservation systems. Those systems would have been improved without the deregulation in
terms of network integration, but their real value for the airline i.e. the information
provided to system analysts is a pure product of deregulation.
The development of these systems in the US is far ahead of their European
counterparts -Sabre being the most sophisticated one-. Out of the two modules that
composed this system, the CRS which provides the data and the seat inventory that
analyses the data, the former is usually highly available through affiliation whereas the
latter is a much more strategic tool that airlines tend to develop for themselves.
Highly important also to the management is the schedule optimization software that
optimizes the schedule of the flight crews and attendants with the constraint of providing
the service.
1.4 A Change in the Industry Structure
1.4.1. Concentration
Consolidations, mergers, new entries and bankruptcies have occurred regularly
since 1978 (see Table 1.3). In 1993, the result was the rising of an oligopoly dominated
by a few global carriers. However, three main types of carriers remain from these ten years
of competition:
* Global Carriers
* National Carriers
* Regional Carriers
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Table 1.3: Major Air Carrier Mergers. Acquisitions. Purchases. and Consolidations in the
United States since 1978 as of December 1991.
American AMERICAN
Air Cal I
TWA (London Routes) I
Eastern (Latin American Routes)
United UNITED
Pan Am (Transpacific, Latin America & [
London Routes)
Air Wisconsin
Delta DELTA
Western I I
Pan Am (European Routes and NY Shuttle. I
Northwest NORTHWEST
North Central Republic I
Southern I
Hughes Airwest I
Texas International TEXAS AIR(a
Continental I I
New York Air I
Frontier People Express
Britt I I
PBA
Rrl-nIff ilotn Am-r1n-
Rocky Mountain
USAir
Eastern 
USAIR
PSA II
Empire Piedmont
Henson I
Midway (Philadelphia gates and Canadian route.
TWA TWA
Ozark I
Pan Am (b) PAN AM
National I
Ransome 
Market Share (%)
1987 1990 1993
13.8 17.5 20.4
16.9 17.2 21.2
12.2 13.4 17.4
10.3 11.7 12.2
19 12.7 8.9
7.1 8.1 7.4
8.2 7.8 4.8
6.3 7 0
Note (a) renamed Continental Airline Holdings
(b) ceased to operate in 1991
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1.4.2. The Global Carriers
This market is increasingly dominated by the mega carriers, United, Northwest,
American and Delta. Although they have really entered the international market recently at
the expense of Pan Am and TWA, their market shares in the international arena is
impressive. Delta is the smallest of this group in the international market but carries twice
as many passengers as Continental, the next largest carrier. However strong their position
in the international market, their main market in terms of passengers-kilometers remains the
domestic market. With exception of Northwest, these airlines are also the strongest on the
domestic market outperforming the other airlines by a factor of at least two.
There seems not to be a general rule on how to become a mega carrier. Northwest
with the purchase of Republic has grown externally, by acquisition. On the other hand,
American has mainly grown through inside growth with the purchase only of routes. It
should be noted that Continental, despite its numerous acquisitions, has not yet reached the
critical mass to be a mega carrier.
They base their strategy on the competitive advantages due to their size. These
competitive advantages can be summarized as follows:
· Economies of scale - maintenance, hub operations, frequencies...-
* Economies of scope - attractiveness of their network, Frequent Flyer Program,
CRS...-
· Market power to deal with the aircraft manufacturers, airports, sale agents...
· Political power: decision to serve or not certain communities.
These carriers have been struck by the 1991 recession and suffered heavy losses in
1992. However, losses are expected to be smaller in 1993. They are badly hurt on the
domestic market by the low cost carriers but still benefit from a favorable international
environment where they are the most efficient airlines and where they will go on expanding
in the short run. Like Pan Am those carriers should not be regarded as eternal, Northwest
is still close to bankruptcy, and the financial situation of American Airline is still weak.
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1.4.3 The Continental National Carriers
In this category fall the second tier airlines: TWA, Continental, USAir and
Southwest. TWA and Continental are classified here although they have a significant
number of international routes. However Continental has emerged from bankruptcy as a
low cost carrier and wants to compete with Southwest on cost; it is currently focusing on
the domestic market. TWA's strategy is unclear. It seems to struggle to stay alive more than
everything else.
USAir and Southwest have little international routes. Their competitive advantages
in the domestic market are very different: USAir bases its strategy on:
* a long established position in the North East
* an hub and spoke system
* its size - CRS, Frequent Flyer Program ..-
* Alliances -with British Airways -
On the other hand Southwest bases its strategy on:
* low cost
* point to point service
* no-frill type of service
* no interlining
Even though USAir is nearly double the size of Southwest, the latter appears to be
much more profitable and challenges the former in its own hubs. "USAir is facing new
competition from the likes of Southwest Airlines, which offered a $49 one way to
Cleveland with no restrictions when entered a former USAir stronghold at the Baltimore-
Washington International Airport in September. Before Southwest arrived, USAir charged
several hundred dollars for the flight..." (Adam, 1993). Southwest's achievements in 1993
were impressive. It dominates 7 of the 25 first OD markets in the Second Quarter 1993,
more than any other carriers (Aviation Daily, 1994). This is partly due to the fact that the
entrance of Southwest on a market increases the size of this market. Would you imagine
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that the 14th OD domestic market in the US is Los Angeles-Phoenix ? In 1992 it had 2.9 %
of the US market share including international routes, it has jumped this year to 3.5 % (an
increase of 20%). Prudential Securities rated Southwest their "Single Best Idea" for 1994
(McAdoo and Prestil, 1994).
Southwest is the only low cost entry to have been successful. However several
factors have favored new entries very recently:
* congestion of hubs favoring point to point strategy
* over supply of workers
* over supply of planes with prices of second hand dropping down (when seeing the
number of aircraft parked in the Mojave desert, it is predictable)
This category of carriers may well be dominated by low cost carriers in the future,
with USAir either completely disappearing or being integrated with BA in a new mega
carrier. The move from Continental to create Cal-Lite can be interpreted as a move to be an
actor in this new market. The more the domestic market will be dominated by low cost
carriers the more mega carriers will be aggressive internationally to retain their market
share.
1.4.4 The Regional Carriers
Small airlines with fleets of turboprops, they have two missions:
· carrying passengers from small towns to hubs (small towns to small towns being made
by the way of hubs)
· feeding intercontinental or continental carriers at their hubs
This second mission makes them increasingly dependent on one of the major
airlines. The major benefits from more flexible work rules and lower wages of the small
carrier whereas the latter carries passengers that will eventually go beyond the hub. It also
takes advantage of the confusion in the passenger's mind created by an identical livery for
the two carriers. Most of the customers think they are subsidiaries. This group includes
American Eagle, United Express...
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Chapter II Expectations from the European Liberalization
The European liberalization is taking place more than a decade after the American
deregulation. Recognizing some of the adverse effects of the American deregulation it is
taking a slightly different direction. However, bringing competition into a market will have
similar impacts across Atlantic even though some of effects may be translated in the
European context. The reasons for that are threefold:
· European liberalization will render the European market very similar to the American
one
* Effects of the American deregulation are spilling across the ocean as the market is
global
· In the medium term Europe will be much more integrated, thus having even more
similarities with the US
Therefore, this chapter adopts the same divisions as the first emphasizing the
similarities and the possible differences.
2.1. A Change in the Service Pattern
2.1.1. The End of the Charter Era
Out of the three passengers segments- business, friends and relative visiting 2
(FRV) and leisure -Only the FRV differs significantly from the US: in the short or medium
run the personal relations across borders will remain scarce. The two other segments will
benefit significantly from the liberalization. Business people will be offered more routes
and more frequencies. However the main change may come from the leisure segment. This
segment is dominated by the charter operations - four out five passengers from England to
Spain board charters (ITA, 1993). The whole concept of charters may disappear as
2 This segment can be included in the leisure segment, in the States however it is often treated separately to
better catch its specificity.
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scheduled airlines will be allowed to reallocate their capacity according to the demand more
easily and adapt their tariffs and services to the leisure segment. The charters may then
either disappear or be the precursors of what could be European low cost "no-frill"
carriers.
2.1.2. Route Structure
Table 2.1: New Routes Opened during the First Three Months of the European Third
Package (Jan. - Mar 1993)3
New "3rd Package" Sectors Airline Type Freq/Week
[Paris -] Turin Bari Air France Cabotage 7
[Paris-] Thessaloniki - Athens Air France Cabotage 3
[Milan-] Valencia - Malaga Alitalia Cabotage 3
Paris -Munich BA [op by TAT] EEC 5th 2 1
Paris - Copenhagen BA [op by TAT] EEC 5th 21
Paris - Stockholm BA [op by TAT] EEC 5th 1 4
[London -] Hanover - Leipzig BA Cabotage 7
[Frankfurt-] Genoa - Naples Lufthansa Cabotage 7
[Munich -] Rome - Bari Lufthansa Cabotage 7
[Munich -] Naples -Palermo Lufthansa Cabotage 7
[Copenhagen-] Hamburg - Leipzig SAS Cabotage 6
[Copenhagen -] Brussels - Lyon SAS Cabotage 5
[Copenhagen-] Stuttgart - Thessaloniki SAS Cabotage 6
Source: Airline / Aircraft Projects
Table 2.1 provides a few examples of new routes opened since the beginning of the
deregulation. Most of them are continuations of previous existing routes or new services
offered by BA. According to some internal papers, most of them are unprofitable. The
main changes have not occurred yet.
Hubs and spoke systems have proven their efficiencies in the US (see PRC, 1993).
Their advantages offset their drawbacks and seem the only way to connect second tier cities
profitably.
3 Cabotage here is EC cabotage meaning a continuing flight from one place in the EC to another town, is
subject to the 50% seat share rule
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Table 2.2.: Airline Operations with and without Hub and Spoke: Two Examples
Northwest arrivals and departures in Minneapolis - St. Paul, 1989
35
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Airplane Arrivals into Heathrow, 1992
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Source: McKinsey Global Institute (1992)
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However, as table 2.2 shows, a typical European airport is far from being operated
as an hub4. Equally important to the schedule are the facilities put in place to ease
connections between two flights -Bob Crandall has recently announced that it would
operate a "continuous hub in Chicago O'Hare, meaning that he will not pay attention to the
schedule assuming that there is sufficient frequency to any city but that he would emphasize
easier connections-. Although no data are available to demonstrate the point, experience
suggests that American airports are much more "connection-oriented" than their European
counterparts.
The American hub and spoke system is very complex with multiple different hubs
serving specific markets (East Coast, West Coast, Trans continental flights). It is the
results of a clear will from the US airlines to control as many airports as possible, partly to
prevent the other carriers from doing so. Due to its smaller size -Europe is one fifth of the
US - the European system may end up being simpler with a few hubs placed in the center
of Europe (such as Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, or Zurich). These hubs would enable to
offer one stop flights from Bergen to Barcelona, or Cork to Leipzig.
2.2. A Change in Pricing
2.2.1. Costs
In 1981, British Airways led by Lord King started its complete reorganization and
reform in order to drive costs down. Six years later, it was privatized and began to
dominate the European market. Thirteen years later, it is looking of new ways of increasing
efficiency and saving money. The main reforms undertaken after 1987 to achieve this result
was to:
· sell 50 planes
· cease 62 unprofitable routes
4 Operating a hub goes far beyond feeding its international routes with regional ones as many European
carriers do.
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· reduce the number of staff from 53,000 in 1981 to 36,000 in 1984 (a decrease of more
than 30% !)
* partially freeze wages
* chase the inefficiency everywhere, maintenance...
* replace old administrators by new comers from industry
This gives now a huge cost advantage to BA in the European scene. Its productivity
in RPKs per employee is twice as much as Lufthansa's one for example (see Table 3.3).
Moreover its wages are the lowest in the industry as shown by Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Average Annual Staff Remuneration. European Airlines 1991
Source: ICAO Digest of Statistics, Series F-P. Fleet and Personnel5
BA's extensions to continental Europe through TAT and Deutsche BA directly
affect its main competitors Lufthansa and Air France. So pressure on cost comes from both
inside Europe and is imported from the US through the North Atlantic market. Recently,
the BA recipe has been more or less followed by KLM and very recently by Lufthansa.
This will increase tremendously in 1997 as the liberalization will be total and the recovery
5 Air France statistics were not available
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of the airline industry will permit even more aggressive moves from the more efficient
carriers.
On a broader scale, pressure from the global market will oblige Europe to lower its
airport and en route fees as well as prevent it from applying the VAT to air transportation.
How important those measures may be they will not be substitute for a steep downward
cost spiral.
2.2.2. Prices
As a result, prices will decrease. This may take some time due to the inability of
carriers to exploit their new rights fully. However one cannot imagine how BA with
much lower costs than the rest of the European airlines will not manage, one way or
another, to decrease prices on all the European market, (for instance by using efficiently its
recently acquired TAT and Deutsche BA). This is true both in the domestic European
market and in the international market.
2.3. Highly Computerized Management Systems
Yield management systems have been very slowly introduced in Europe. For fear
of becoming dependent to the US carriers, European ones have tried to develop their own
systems. Although no data are available, it seems that these attempts lack both funds and
support from the management. As a result, neither Galileo nor Amadeus matches Sabre or
Apollo in terms of data provided to the airlines. As liberalization is put in place, pressure
on the European carriers to affiliate themselves to an American system and thus benefit to
their advantages will increase. The future of the two European CRS is therefore unsure.
Either a European consortium will spend an enormous amount of money upgrading and
integrating both of them -an effort similar to the one done with Airbus- or carriers will seek
for more and more connections with the US systems. Because of the way Sabre is
structured -it is managed by an independent subsidiary of American Airline- it may be the
major beneficiary of this switch.
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As for the yield management itself, that is the actual seat allocation and pricing, BA
is said to have the best system in Europe second only to American Airlines in the
world(Katz, 1994). Apart from BA, it is still a relatively new subject in Europe. Most of
them are still very "manual". The development of yield management is almost inevitable.
As for the CRSs, other European companies may find it cheaper to directly import from
the States a system, either from the carriers or from consulting firms specialized in seats
inventory. The implementation of such systems in Europe is thus expected to be very fast,
as soon as liberalization makes their use indispensable.
2.4. A Change in the Industry Structure
2.4.1. Concentration
As shown by Table 2.4, the globalization as well as the concentration of the
European carriers has begun far before the European liberalization, partly to anticipate it
and partly to respond to the US moves. In Europe BA comes from the merger of BEA and
BOAC in 1974, and has successively absorbed British Caledonian and Dan Air. Air France
has merged with UTA and Air Inter. In 1992, the six largest groups generated around 73%
of the scheduled intra-European and domestic passenger traffic as opposed to 60% in 1986
(Doganis, 1994).
No major flag carriers have yet disappeared. It is unlikely to happen in the very
short run: the political impact would be too much of a burden for the concerned
government. Europe may therefore witness more cross equity sharing or alliances than
LBOs. This, however, may not be the case in the long run: the Belgians have partly given
the control of their flag carrier to Air France and one should remember that Pan Am - now
defunct - was also viewed by the public as "eternal".
Global alliances are also created with BA ahead of the rest of Europe with its
network of partners covering the three main markets (Qantas in Australia, USAir in the US)
and its two subsidiaries on the continent (TAT and Deutsche BA).
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Table 2.4: Major Air Carrier Mergers. Acquisitions. Purchases. and Consolidation in
Europe as of December 1992
Has Integrated / Controls
- -- -Equity Stake (cross or not)
Msrket Share (%]
1 992
Air France AIR FRANCE 1 9.6
UTA
Air Inter 
Euroberlin I
Sabena --------------------------------
CSA ............
BEA BRITISH AIRWAYS 1 4.0
BOAC
Britsih Cal
Dan Air
BEA Brymon
Delta Air (Deutsche BA)
TAT
Iberia IBERIA 1 . 6
Aviaco I
Viva
Lufthansa LUFTHANSA 11. 1
Luxair … 
SAS SAS 9.8
Jienfyg I :
British Midland - I
Logannair- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Alitalis ALITALIA 6.7
Malev -i 
Swissair SWISSAIR 3.4
Crossair I
KLM KLM 3.4
Transavia I
Air UK - - - - - - -
Source: Doganis (1994)
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2.4.2 Global Carriers
The increasing concentration has given birth to European global carriers. These
carriers are not mega carriers, as their size is about a third of the size of their American
counterparts in terms passengers carried. However they are global because they compete in
the main international markets. This strategy have been adopted so far by the three major
carriers in Europe namely British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France and by KLM.
Two major components characterize this strategy as illustrated by British Airways.
Firstly a pure European component: to benefit from the new liberalization without having to
actually set a new subsidiary in a foreign country, British Airways has acquired TAT and
Delta Air (renamed Deutsche BA). These acquisitions enable BA to compete more directly
against other European airlines and for BA to take full advantage of its cost structure.
Secondly, in order to become a truly mega carrier British Airways has taken a foothold in
each of the other two main markets with stakes in USAir and Qantas. KLM, which is
following the same strategy is integrating itself even more tightly with Northwest.
Up to now, neither of these two steps have been financially profitable for the
concerned airlines. The reasons are threefold:
· TAT and Deutsche BA have not yet fully benefited from British Airways structure
* the market is not fully liberalized yet
* USAir and Northwest are in a very bad financial health
However, these kind of alliances will undoubtedly continue in order to:
* benefit from a denser and a wider network
· realize some economies of scale and scope
An interesting attempt has been made in 1993 by Austrian, Swissair, SAS and
KLM to build a new global airline. This has mainly failed because KLM had already too
many commitments. Austrian, Swissair and SAS have the options of trying to rebuild a
new alliance or getting closer ties with one or another of the global carrier. None of them
seems ready to turn into a low cost carrier.
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2.4.3. European Local Players
A strategy that would only focus on Europe is rather unexplored. However, the
expected fall of the charters may favor its emergence. One can witness some signs of rising
of such airlines such as AOM in France. Two different strategies can be envisaged at this
point. Either being controlled or allied to a major and thus benefiting from its expertise as
well as certain economies of scale or scope. The second strategy would be to become a
European low cost carrier. It may prove to be much harder in Europe than in the US for
there is no high density routes that are not currently served by a non-stop service. One of
the places where such an airline could develop would be in France where the domestic
market is appropriate and the congestion at the airports is low.
Some more drastic moves may be expected if a carrier managed to have some costs
in line with those of Southwest. It could then generate a totally new demand.
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Chapter III Recommendations for Air France
3.1 Where Does Air France Stand ?
Air France has sustained a 12% growth during the last three years due to the
acquisition of Air Inter and UTA as compared to the Air France, Air Inter and UTA traffic
combined in 1989 the growth would be less than 1% on average per year. However this
integration has neither induced some major cost savings nor favored a globalization of Air
France. Costs per ASK are among the highest in Europe and Air France has no major
alliances with any US or Asian carriers. On the contrary, the poor integration of Air
France's three components as well as an obsolete structure have led to major losses
throughout the nineties. In the same time, British Airways was profitable and Lufthansa
was on its way to recovery (see Table 3.1)
Air France needs a profound reorganization that goes far beyond a few adjustments.
It has to experience a revolution as important as that of British Airways in the eighties. It is
the only way Air France will catch up even with Lufthansa which itself is going through
major changes.
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Figure 3.1. Strategic Map for Air France
Source: IATA World Statistics
Table 3.1: Comparative Financial Results for Air France
Source: Alberganti (1993)
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-8000
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3.2. Cap 1993
The "Cap 1993" plan (On Course for 1993), launched in 1991, was supposed to
give Air France a competitive advantage over its competitors. The plan was reinforced in
October 1992 by the "Plan de Retour a l'Equilibre" (Return to Profitability as officially
translated but a more closer translation could be Return to Break Even..). This plan was
backed by the French Government.
Table 3.2. Comparison Between the Cap 1993 Plan and Other Carriers Achievement
Air France British
Cap 93 Airways Lufthansa
Actions on:
Labor
Overstaffing Weak Very High High
Wages Moderate High Moderate
Workrules Moderate High High
Routes
Hub Structure High High Moderate
Global Network Weak Very High High
Marketing
Image High High Moderate
Pricing Weak Very High High
Management
Corporate Culture Weak Very High High
Organization Moderate High Moderate
Computerization Weak Very High Weak
Source:
Air France: Attali (1994)
British Airways: Reed (1990)
Lufthansa: Velocci (1993), Genthial (1993)
The "Cap 1993" plan was far less drastic than British Airways' actions in the
eighties and was comparable to the plan now being followed by Lufthansa. The weakest
points were:
* cost consciousness and cutting was not enough emphasized;
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* shift in corporate culture was not sufficient;
· effort on yield management was not sufficient.
Due to lots of reasons, the plan was not accepted by the unions. This, in turn, led
to the October 1993 strike. The government stepped in, dismissed Bernard Attali as CEO,
promised to abandon the plan and appointed as new CEO Christian Blanc, who has been
cited for the strength he showed as CEO of the RATP, the Parisian public transportation
system. However he had no experience whatsoever in the airline industry and unlike Colin
Marshall at British Airways does not come from a harsh competitive environment.
3.3. A Change in Service Pattern
3.3.1. A New Service for a New Image
Air France used to benefit from its image as a luxury carrier. However, this image
has changed to that of an expensive and inefficient carrier. This image has been badly hurt
both by the October strike and the publicity made around the poor results of the airline, not
talking about the FFr 20 billion that Air France may get from the tax payer. In contrast,
British Airways is viewed as the winner (Katz, 1994) and Lufthansa as going through a
successful reorganization.
Air France will not turn into a "no-frill" carrier. On the contrary, it has to improve
its image by improving its services. Which begins by a pure marketing campaign that
emphasizes the new market-oriented attitude. But it has to go beyond that and a campaign
should be launched among the employees and the passengers to identify areas which need
improvement.
3.3.2. A more Efficient Route Structure
Air France benefits from the most promising airport in Europe. No airports come
near CDG in terms of extension possibilities: 3 more runways can be built (Shearman,
1993). With the building of CDG 2, Air France has the opportunity of creating the first hub
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in Europe. The increasing difficulties to build new airports in Europe where the nimby "not
in my back yard" philosophy prevails, will ensure CDG a long term competitive advantage.
Special attention should be brought to the organization of the terminal. CDG 2, which
would group Air France, Air Inter and its allies, should be organized so as to facilitate all
the connections between two flights. Schedules have to be adapted to take fully advantage
of hub operations. CDG is conveniently located for the North Atlantic flights and all the
flights UK / Scandinavia - Spain / Italy. Moreover an efficient hub will enable Air France to
regain the market share it has lost to "sixth freedom" carriers such as KLM in the market
originating from the French provinces.
Air France may want to find a second hub in Europe better to serve flights
crossing Eastern Europe (Brussels seems to be too close to Paris for that purpose). Prague
may have been the right choice, Vienna or Varsaw could be a new one. This hub would
conveniently serve all flights from western to eastern Europe as well as flights from
Scandinavia to Greece / Turkey. The best way to do it would to form a close alliance with
any of the airlines controlling these airports. The alliance with CSA has come to an end (Le
Monde, 1994), Air France should therefore find a new ally to be present in Eastern
Europe.
Having the two hubs will not be sufficient unless the whole restructure is re-built,
with a new schedule, new services offered or closed. Air France has recently opened some
new routes to Italy all of them unprofitable. One answer to that may to feed those routes
with some travelers from Manchester or Bergen...
3.4. Costs, Costs, Costs
3.4.1. Develop a Cost Consciousness Culture
"BA appears to have been more successful than most carriers in spreading a culture
of cost-consciousness throughout the company" (Katz, 1994). The success of BA seems
no miracle. On the top of having considerably reduced its number of staff, BA has
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installed some cost saving programs: each director is required to defend its budget, and
exercises are launched to encourage staff to make suggestions on how to save money in
their departments (Katz 1994). Air France has to develop this cost consciousness by
changing the way it is managed. The first step however is to make the necessary big cuts.
3.4.2 Labor Costs
As previously stated, labor cost represents the major part of the controllable cost of
the airline and also a significant part of total cost. Labor cost is composed of wages and
benefits as well as labor productivity. Wages at Air France have increased tremendously
during the last twenty years for the same reasons as in the whole air transport industry as
well as because Air France was a French champion and therefore benefited from multiple
State aids and supports. Many pilots are still paid more than the CEO (Gallacher 1994). In
1990, pilot salaries including benefits were ranging from FFr 280 000 to FFr 870 000 for
less than 80 hours of work per month. Total labor cost in Air France amounted to 41.8% of
total turnover in 1990 as opposed to 32.3% at Lufthansa and 24.2% at British Airways
(Problemes Economiques # 2300, 1992). Lufthansa has reached a number under 25% in
1993 (Gallacher 1994)
More important to the cost structure of Air France is the steady increase in the gap
between Air France and its main competitors. KLM and British Airways were in 1990 far
more efficient than Air France and have increased their efficiency in the following two
years whereas Air France has experienced a decline! (See Table 3.3) British Airways is
going on with more reforms and reorganizations. The American example shows that there
is lots of room for even more efficiency.
In order to fill the gap between itself and its competitors - as wished by Christian
Blanc - Air France has to take even more painful and drastic measures than those
undertaken by Lufthansa. Lufthansa cut more than 6,100 jobs and is continuing to scale
down its work force. Although firing people is certainly not enjoyable, Air France should
32
target a down scaling of at least this magnitude. Air France should also adopt some new
work rules in order to increase the number of block hours performed by it staff per month.
Table 3.3.: Labor Productivity in Different European Airlines
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Air France Lufthansa
-3.5% +12.4%
Source: Airline reports (Reuter)
KLM British Airways
+23.8% +34.1%
3.4.3 Maintenance costs
Another reason for high costs at Air France is the extreme diversity in its fleet.(See
Table 3.4) Lufthansa with only 7 types of family seems to have a competitive advantage.
However, the difference is far smaller than that witnessed in labor productivity. Therefore,
if fleet diversity should decrease, it is not the core of the problem.
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Table 3.4. Fleet Diversity of the three Major Airlines in Europe
3.5 Catching up with the most Advanced Technologies
The cost and benefits of upgrading Amadeus has to be closely compared with the
two other solutions: negotiating a technology transfer agreement with Sabre or Apollo and
being affiliated with one of the two. This, would implicitly recognize the failure of
Amadeus but it would be better to negotiate a technology transfer agreement and to
establish close contacts with a leading US system than to invest in an outdated technology.
This will enable Air France to benefit more easily from the major breakthroughs that are
expected in the near future.
As for the yield management itself, Air France tried to set one but it does not work
properly (some say it does not work at all). For this part too, a technology transfer or a
licensing agreement may be less costly than to actually (try to) build a new one. Which
needs a huge amount of money that Air France does not have.
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3.6 A More Aggressive Strategy
3.6.1. Change in Corporate Culture
Air Transport has long been seen as a highly technological industry. Although
aircraft are still so, passengers do not feel this way any more. There is a need to change the
corporate culture to switch from a company that was capable of operating the Concord to a
company capable of inventing new marketing tools to attract new clients. The most recent
invention of British Airways was the Business Class. American Airlines launched the
Frequent Flyer program. On a smaller scale, companies are producing new marketing
devices every week. Air France usually tries to catch up.
The example of British Airways in the eighties is very insightful. When Lord King
came into power in 1981 and Colin Marshall in 1983, they appointed lots of new managers
coming from much more competitive and much more consumer oriented industries, Colin
Marshall himself coming from Avis. This change in turn has re-oriented the company.
They have spent millions in finding a new livery, in engineering better seats. The
privatization was a organized as a tremendous show. And the carrier was in much better
shape.(Reed 1990) In a less drastic way Lufthansa is going through same process.
This culture change may therefore mean a change in the recruiting process, targeting
more business oriented managers (either by their education or their previous experiences)
and less towards "pure" engineers.
This culture change should, in turn, lead to a more aggressive airline. The likely
outcome of the liberalization is an increasing competition among the players. In this classic
game theory framework, Air France does not want to be the only one collaborating while
the other are competing...
3.6.2 Integrate Air Inter
Air France is in a unique situation of controlling 72% of an airline whose size is
roughly equivalent to its own. British Airways emerged from the merger of BEA and
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BOAC. This merger was difficult because the two corporate cultures were very different:
BOAC had a long-haul network and considered itself as an extension off the foreign office
whereas BEA was more commercially oriented (Reed, 1990). The two cultures remained
for a while creating lots of inefficiencies. Having learned the lesson, British Airways when
taking over BCal totally incorporated this much smaller firm within a few days. Numerous
examples have shown how painful such mergers can be for the employees but how
dangerous it is for a company to have two different entities as the example of Pan Am and
National illustrates. Therefore Air France should entirely integrate Air Inter, gaining in
efficiency and consistency. This real merger is all the more urgent since the two networks
begin to overlap each other creating sources of conflict. This merger will have to be
preceded by a total purchase of Air Inter by Air France or by SNCF accepting some shares
of the new entity.
3.6.3. Secure the Domestic Market
The French domestic market is by far the biggest in Europe (see Annex 7). Air
France has therefore a competitive advantage over its competitors by controlling this
market. However, it has to fight against two different type of competitions:
· New entrants on domestic routes such as AOM on Paris Nice
· the TGV
The TGV is optimum for a distances ranging from 400 to 600 kilometers. It is
favored by the French government which continuously aids SNCF. However on longer
routes, Air Inter should be able to retain most of its market share. On shorter route, where
Air Inter would have some difficulties in maintaining it shares, some joint ventures with
some airlines may be possible ("France Express"). Taking into account the specificity of
the French market with a potentially dense high speed network, Air France should also
reach some agreements with SNCF in order to facilitate the connections between the TGV
and Air France's flights.
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3.6.4. Build a Consistent Network throughout Europe
Europe is a much more fragmented entity than the US. De localizing one's fleet or
employees is very costly . The only way of taking advantage of the airline new rights and
to build a consistent network serving all Europe is to acquire new airlines abroad (or
stakes).
British Airways has done that with TAT and Deutsche BA. Air France's network
was composed of CSA, Sabena and Euroberlin. However, none of the three is very
promising. CSA was undoubtedly a good strategic option with a good location of Prague, a
window opened towards the Eastern European market. The Czech Republic was one of the
most promising States in Eastern Europe. However the project was not flawless and the
bride was not as efficient as expected. Furthermore, the increasing nationalistic movement
in the Czech Republic forced its government to ask Air France to divest its shares. An
agreement was signed on the divestiture on March 22, 1994 (Le Monde, 1994). The
Sabena deal was a pure defensive move in order to prevent BA from having a hub 300 km
from Paris. However the future of this alliance may be questionable as no synergy
whatsoever exists between the two airlines. Lastly Euroberlin which appeared at first to be
a good investment has become much more inadequate since it competes with Lufthansa, its
second main shareholder.
Air France should therefore reconsider some new partners. Austrian with a hub in
Vienna would be a good option if not already engaged with Lufthansa and Swissair. Other
Eastern Europe carriers could be considered such as LOT in Poland, which is doing
reasonably well. A broad alliance with Lufthansa is unlikely to happen as the two markets
are far too much overlapping.
3.65. Become Truly Global
Air France falls behind its European competitors in terms of building alliances.
However such alliances are important because they are the only way for a European carrier
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to propose a wide range a destinations in the three main markets: Europe, North America
and the Pacific Rim. Moreover, it is essential that their intercontinental flights are fed with
established carriers in those markets.
KLM has a very integrated alliance with Northwest, British Airways has stakes
both in USAir and Qantas and Lufthansa begins an alliance with United. Air France has
some special relationships with Continental and Air Canada as well as a foothold in
Vietnam airlines. However, none of those alliances are definitive nor effective. The choice
of an American partner is tricky, three main points have to be considered:
· synergy of the network (without any overlapping)
· good will of the partner
· its financial health
When comparing two possible options such as American Airlines and Continental:
American Airlines has a wider and denser network than Continental, although with some
overlaps with Air France. It is in a much better financial health, Continental has just gone
through several bankruptcies and its future may rely on the success of the operation Cal
Lite. It can also bring in the deal its CRS and pricing system which Air France lacks. On
the other hand American Airline may be suspected of using Air France to invade the
European market without any deep commitment to follow up on the agreement. The
question is therefore: does Air France want to be the leader in a second tier team or the
follower in a first tier group ?
British Airways has chosen its "Continental" with USAir, although a little bigger,
and has to pay for its poor results with the fear of a possible bankruptcy. In the long run,
however it may give British Airways the entire control of an American Airline. Lufthansa
has chosen its "American" with United, which involves the risk of not controlling the
outcome of the agreement.
As for the pacific Rim, Air France has some talks with Vietnam Airline, however
this Airline is certainly not a major one in the region. Very few Asian carriers are in close
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relations with a European one with the exception of Qantas with BA and Singapore with
Swissair. The door is therefore opened to any kind of new partner.
3.7. Summary of the Recommendations
Even though Air France may officially condemn the European liberalization, for it is
not bringing to the consumer what it should and because Air France is not prepared to
compete in such an environment, Air France should anticipate its outcome, knowing that its
claims will at most delay certain aspects of the liberalization. It should anticipate a
competition as fierce as the one experienced in the US. The lack of competition in the
beginning of the European liberalization is due to the recession and some technical
problems such as airport and air traffic congestion.
This new competition will bring, a much more market-oriented way of doing
business with efficiency as the key word. This in turn will put pressure on cost, will force
a re-design of each airline's network, will make the latest technological tools necessary and
will oblige flag carriers to become more global. British Airways has started to anticipate
those changes, Lufthansa makes it clear that it wants to catch up. Air France should also
make such a commitment.
To anticipate these changes and be ready when the effects of the liberalization will be more
present, Air France should complete these necessary reforms:
· a change in corporate culture, switching from a world of technicians to a world of
sellers and managers
* extreme cost consciousness - specially focusing on labor cost -
* complete integration of Air Inter, loosing Air Inter's goodwill but gaining a lot in
efficiency
* operation of a hub and spoke system in Europe, taking full advantage of CDG possible
extensions
· acquisition of the latest technological tool: CRSs, seat inventory systems,
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* building a long term commitment with both a US carrier and an Asian carrier.
Air France has lost a few years as compared to its closest competitors. It did so by
wasting energy in fighting the European liberalization. This thesis has proposed a much
more pragmatic approach based on this quotation from Montaigne " Faute de changer les
6venements, change toi toi-meme" (" For lack of changing the events, change yourself").
None of the competitive disadvantages are definitive and Air France may well be ahead of
the competition by the year 2010 with CDG being the major hub in Europe.
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ANNEX 1: Industry Outlook
General Context
The context of the airline industry is characterized by the clash of three industrial cultures
within an increasingly liberalized and global aviation market (Kevin, 1994).
* the liberal laissez-faire culture which is prevailing in the US, the UK and the
Netherlands. Their carriers are mainly private, profit driven and have become highly
efficient. Those countries tend to welcome deregulation and open skies
· the social market view, airlines are viewed as a close partner to the State, they are
expected to support the welfare programs supported be the government as well as
employment. Ownership is therefore mixed - public, private -, examples are Germany,
Switzerland and Sweden
· the state ownership, centralized culture where firms operate as extensions of
government policy. They should provide employment as well as infrastructure and
technology development. Ownership is usually public. Fall in this category France,
Italy, Belgium and Spain.
These cultures, in turn, have a tremendous effect on the cost structure of the airlines
and their efficiency, labor costs and working rules being major components of the airline
cost structure.
As flag carriers became too expensive and pressure for privatization and
deregulation increase, the State owned culture tends to loose ground to the other two.
States Aids are more and more attacked in courts (The Reuter European Community
Report, 1994). The "Comitd des Sages" report that has been revealed at the end of January
1994 calls for a last shot aid, calls for more privatizations and denounces any temptation to
roll back in the agenda of the European liberalization (Barber, Rachel and Ridding, 1994).
Crucial for the next few years is the conflict between the two remaining cultures -
the liberal laissez - faire and the social market one -. The outcome of this battle is not
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straight forward. The two cultures may both survive, with on one hand more and more
synergy between the labor and the management to improve competitiveness in the social
market culture and on the other hand more pragmatism in the liberal ideology to
accommodate economical realities of Europe (unemployment, social practices..).
Market
Regional Segmentation
The world's airlines carried an estimated total of 1.2 billion passengers on
scheduled services in 1992. International passengers (300 million, an increase of 13
percent over 1991) represented 26 percent of the total. Domestic traffic remained steady at
867 million passengers (IATA, 1992). The segmentation of the market is as shown on
Figure Al.1.: Major Traffic Flows Between Regions in 1992
Asi
SW
Pacific
Notes:
1. Percent of IATA Total Schedule Traffic - RPKs
1. Traffic flows between regions less than I% are not shown
2. Traffic within regions shown in boxes
Source: World Air Transport Statistics, IATA 1992
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The American market dominates the world with more than one third of the traffic. It
should be noted that this market is closed for non American firms. Comes second the North
Atlantic market open to both European and American. then the European market heavily
regulated an also protected and finally the American Asian market. The American carriers
have access to more 60 % of the market while a European firm would play in 36 % of the
market (assuming that the liberalization has occurred in all Europe, giving fifth freedom and
cabotage to all the carriers as due April 1, 1997). It is noticeable that the traffic Europe -
rest of the world is exactly the same as the traffic North America - rest of the world (26.3%
of the market).
Table A 1.1 Traffic Growth per Region
Realon 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1994 1995 1996
Europe 8.2 3.5 7.6 2.8 4.4 4.7
Africa 13.5 4.7 2.9 5.9 6.2 6.5
Asia & Pacific 17.0 7.8 11.1 9.3 10.4 10.6
South America 14.6 2.7 5.7 5.9 7.1 7.9
Middle East 24.7 10.1 4.5 6.9 6.5 6.8
North America 1 1.0 5.6 7.5 6.1 6.6 7.0
1994 - 1996: projections
Source: ICAO Aviation Statistics of the World
As far as growth is concerned, Asia comes first both in past growth and in future
prospect. Europe and the US are more mature market. Finally, the inter-continental market
seems to be the most growing market, with Asia catching up with Europe and the States as
an attractive pole.
Passenger Segmentation
Common practice divides the passengers into two broad segments:
Business Travelers, who demand high flexibility in terms of refund and schedule
change, plus a reasonable comfort. Some are driven by the "not my own money
economy" (such as big firms, lawyers) and will be frequent flyers addicted ( a true
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bribe in that case), other will have either strict internal rule or are coming from small
fnnms and will ask for the smallest price given this flexibility.
* Non-Business very price-sensitive and ready for less flexibility (non re fundability,
strange schedule...). This group is also usually divided between the pure leisure group
and the friends and relatives visitors (FRV).
Table A1.2: Passenger Segmentation
Source: Shearman, 1992
The trend is towards more and more leisure travelers. This is bad news for the
airlines as far as fares and yield are concerned. This is probably bad news for business
travelers who would have to pay a higher premium for the flexibility and the comfort.
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The industry is heavily concentrated with the 10 biggest players accounting for
more than 45% of the industry total revenue. All these major players are either competitors
of Air France on some routes or potential partners in case of US domestic players.
Table A1.3. The 20 Largest Airline Companies by Revenue (1992)
1 AMR
2 UAL
3 Air France (b)
4 Lufthansa
5 Delta Air Lines
6 Japan Airlines
7 British Airways
8 Northwest Airlines
9 Federal Express
10 All Nippon Airways
11 USAir Group
12 SAS
13 Alitalia
14 Continental Airlines Holdings
15 Swire Pacific
16 KLM
17 Swissair
18 Iberia Airlines
19 Trans World Airlines
20 Singapore Airlines (c)
T o tal.......................... 
Country
US
US
France
Germany
US
Japan
UK
US
US
Japan
US
Sweden
Italy
US
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Switzerland
Spain
US
Singapore
Revenues (a)
Smilions
14,495
12,889
12,300
11,075
10,837--
10,421
9,416
7,963
7,550
7,159
6,696
5,909
5,673
5,575
5,029
4,663
4,415
4,389
3,634
3,468
150,088
i % Change
* 11.6
9.7
* 4.0
14.0
18.2
(1.9)
9.9
5.7
(1.8)
7.9
2.5
10.6
19.8
0.4
16.2
11.6
3.1
15.5
(1.4)
18.9
9.2
Profits
$ mi ions
(935.0)
(956.8)
(616.8)
(248.7)
(506.3)
383.6
301.1
(386.2)
(113.8)
(9.4)
(1,228.9)
(149.4)
(11.9)
(125.3)
570.9
(318.7)
80.3
(343.7)
(317.7)
513.0
(4,420)
PKs
millions
156,737
148,841
52,349
48,661
129,541
55,090
72,491
94,345
38,310
56,482
15,699
27,390
69,317
27,466
31,054
16,154
23,857
46,689
37,105
1,147,578
TKs
millions
1,636
1,930
3,769
4,284
1,197
3,229
2,461
2,694
5,768
627
215
390
1,268
560
1,670
2,392
1,063
575
534
2,306
38,568
Note (a) Consolidated operating revenues include those for non transportation acivities
(b) Air France Group comprises Air France, UTA, Air Inter
(c) from World Air Transport Statistics, IATA 1992
Source: Fortune August 23, 1993 and IATA World Air Transport Statistics, 1992
Revenues are highly dependent on volatile exchange rates and may not be a good
basis for a ranking, however they are the only way to aggregate all the different activities of
the airlines. Air carriers are not competing only in terms of passengers kilometers but also
on the freight market and some of them on other traveling facilities (hotels, tour
operators..).
The US dominates the market with 8 companies in this top 20. It becomes even
more striking when looking at the passengers kilometers with 7 US companies in the top
6 In this paragraph we have chosen to disregard Aeroflot for which the data are unclear.
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I
10. A company as American Airlines has as many passengers kilometers as nearly BA, Air
France and Lufthansa all together and more in terms of passengers carried.
US companies have, on average a lower revenue per Passenger Kilometer as
shown in the table than the European ones. That may have two reasons, European Airlines
may be more diversified or they may charge a higher price per passenger kilometers.
Financial results are dreadful. There are twenty airlines companies in the top 50
transportation companies analyzed by Fortune Magazine. They have eight out of the ten
worst results (the two others being SNCF-and Deutsche Bundesbahn which have other
priorities than making profit). However they are not equally dreadful, the American
companies have suffered the most (even though they have also changed their accounting
practice which has, in turn, deepened their lost), the three Asian companies have good
results, and the European are in between with the noticeable example of BA on the good
side and Air France on the bad side.
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TuhlA Al d Th& 9 I sra.t Airline Comnanies bv Revenues (1992) at a Glance
Companies Country Comments
1 AMR US Has grown up through acquisitions and internally,
Alliance with Cathay Pacific
2 UAL US Has increased its market share iin the Pacific Rim
Try to enter the European market, an alliance with Lufthansa
3 Air France Group France In deep financial trouble, has to integrate Air Inter and UTA
Has a good network of alliances, CSA, Sabena, Aeromexico...
4 Lufthansa Germany In reorganization, is the major beneficiary of the Eastern Europe market,
Alliance with United
5 Delta Air Lines US Has difficulty in entering the European market with Hub in Frankfurt,
Alliance with Singapore and swissair
6 Japan Airlines Japan Huge international growth, is currently under a reorganization plan
7 British Airways UK In the black ink for a few year, the only large privatized airline in Europe
Stake in USAir, TAT, Qantas...
8 Northwest Airlines US Strong in the Pacific Rim, Never far way from bankruptcy
Strong equity swap with KLM
9 Federal Express US The largest air freight carrier in the world
10 All Nippon Airways Japan Dominates the domestic Japanese Market
Has started routes towards the US and Europe, Alliance with SAS
11 USAir Group US In deep financial trouble, good presence on the East Cost
Alliance with British Airways
12 SAS Sweden High quality carriers
Alliance addicted, mainly with Swissair and Austrian
13 Alitalia Italy Has to be reorganized before privatization
No major Alliance
14 Continental Airlines US Back and forth in bankruptcy, has emerged as a new low cost carrier
Holdings equity owned by SAS
15 Swire Pacific (Cathay) Hong Kong Tries to dominate the South East Asian market
Alliance with American Airlines
16 KLM Netherlands Strong commitment towards liberalization
Owns 49% of Northwest
17 Swissair Switzerland High quality service
Alliances with Delta, Singapore, Austrian, SAS...
18 Iberia Airlines Spain Handicapped by the badly managed hub in Madrid,
Strong in South America, with the possible purchase of Aerolinas
19 Trans World Airlines US Back and forth in bankruptcy
Alliance with ANA and Air Canada
20 Singapore Airlines Singapore High Quality and profitable
Alliance with Delta and Swissair
Source: Various Articles in "Aviation Week and Technology" and in "Air Transport World"
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ANNEX 2: Airline Industry Structural Analysis
General Framework
The framework adopted is the now classical Porter's industry analysis framework
(Porter, 1980).
Figure A2.1: Framework for each of the markets (Europe. US. Pacific Rim)
;ncies
SUBSTITUTES 
-Surface Transportation
-Telecommunication
Rivalry Amongst Players
Regulatory Order
1944: Chicago
Central to the mode of competition is the regulatory order. The framework has
evolved since 1944, when the first agreements were signed in Chicago. During this
conference, two different points of view were expressed:
* Great Britain and most of the European countries favored the creation of a centralized
body to regulate and coordinate air transportation
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* The US favored bilateral or multilateral agreements, with no loss of sovereignty from
Nations.
The US seemed to have won the debates as the ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Organization) has a very limited role and most of the agreements are bilateral. Five degrees
of freedom have been defined during this conference and out of the five only the two first
have been agreed and signed. These two are technical and can not be considered as
commercial.
Figure A2.2: The Freedom Rights. based on an airline registered in country A
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Freedom 1:
Right to overfly a foreign country
Freedom 2:
Right to make a non traffic stop e.g. refueling
Freedom 3:
Freedom 3 passengers in a foreign country
Right to set down passengers in a foreign country
.A rNLC
Source: Shearman, 1992
Since then numerous bilateral agreements have been signed, the major ones being
Bermuda I and Bermuda II. Each country has managed to keep control on which and
how often carriers are allowed to land on their airports. (Noting that Great Britain had
enjoyed during this period one of the most restrictive agreement with the United States).
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Freedom 4:
Right to pick up passengers from a foreign country
Freedom 5:
The right to carry passengers between two foreign
countries
Cabotage:
The right to carry passengers within a foreign country
|'iI
Distribution
Distribution is divided into two sub groups whose relative share of the market changes over
time and space. This two groups are:
· Travel Agents (70-90% of the market)
· Direct Sale (10 - 30% of the market)
Deregulation of the market as well as the boom of the CRS (see below) have
increased the relative market share of travel agencies from 60 % in the beginning of the 70s
to 90 % percent now in the US (Shearman, 1992). They operate in two different ways:
* They can book reservations on behalf of the customer, collect the price of the ticket and
pay back a Central Bank which in turn re-distributes the money to the airlines (the Bank
Settlement Plan system). In this system the agency receives a commission from the
airline on each ticket sold.
· They can buy a block of seats in a flight up front and sell it back with their own mark-
up such as all inclusive package, taking the risk of wrong forecast. This method is
appreciated by the charter and the small companies. (This system is used in France
more than anywhere else)
The future of the booking system depends on the success of the information
highways. New networks will allow the airlines to increase their direct sales, with new
more friendly personal computer based reservation systems. In the short term in Europe,
the trend towards more and more sales through travel agencies should continue as the price
system becomes more elaborate.
The Computerized Reservation System
The two major CRS in the US are Sabre and Apollo. In Europe two main
consortiums have built their own Galileo and Amadeus, Galileo has been later linked with
Apollo, and Amadeus with System one the small CRS operated by Continental (see Figure
A2.3).
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Figure A2.3. Major CRS Networks Worldwide
USA
Source: Swissair Document
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The format of these CRSs and the way they operate have been attacked for several
reasons:
* they used to discriminate the other airline by putting in the first screen only flights from
the owner of the system even though they could either more expensive or less
convenient for the customer;
* they tend to favor the price competition as the program to find the cheapest way is
usually included, whereas you can not ask only flights with hot meals;
* they favor the globalization of the airlines and the concept of code sharing, which is not
associated with a much better schedule coordination is simply misleading for the
customer.
Code sharing and ownership of CRS proved to be useful as studied have shown
than most of the flights are booked after the first screen (83%).
SupDliers
They include:
- aircraft
- labor
- fuel
- airports
- air traffic control
Aircraft
The final agreement the Uruguay round of the GATT in December 1993 was
viewed as the best deal countries could achieve though it remains very loose (Rodier,
1993). The agreement puts a threshold of direct aids (33 % of any particular project for
more than 100 seat planes) and 4% of indirect aids.
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The industry is very well structured with Boeing having enjoyed a dominant
situation for a long time, Airbus arriving second in market share and having commands
similar to the ones of Boeing, finally Mc Donnell Douglas arriving third.
The aircraft industry is of such an importance that most governments have stepped
in to protect their industry. This issue leads to bitter statements between the US and
Europe, each accusing the other party to be "unfair".
Aircraft manufacturers' market power has tremendously decreased due to:
· High competition and oversupply
* Decreasing number of buyers due to the rising of leasing companies
However, first move advantages are important for several reasons:
· spare parts account for more than half of the price of an airplane during its life
* there is an expensive switching price due to retraining
· for cost sake airlines tend to homogenize their fleet.
This in turn leads to harsh battles either to capture a new comer -such as Air
Vietnam- or to make one big player switch for one manufacturer to the other as the $500
million grant of Airbus for Northwest has proven.
The situation will remain similar as long as there is an over supply of aircraft and as
no major technological breakthrough occurs.
Labor:
Labor forces in air transportation have traditionally enjoyed one of the highest
salaries in the industry. This was particularly true for cabin crews and pilots. However,
since the deregulation in the US and the move towards more cost concerns, the salaries
have been reduced in real terms.
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Table A2.1: Average wages in US airlines as compared with US workers
Sources: New York Times (1993)
These reductions have been the results of different events:
· implementation of a two-tier system for new employees (United and American)
* non unionized entrants
* exchange of salary cuts with corporate shares(TWA, Northwest, United and now Air
France ? Lufthansa...)
* wage freezes
Important among those measures is the exchange of equity share against labor
concessions. United Airlines has proposed to sell the majority of the shares to employees
and to give them three seats at the board of directors with a veto power on major issues.
This experience will certainly be interesting. As stated in Le Monde "the US is reinventing
socialism". This solution although not free from internal contradictions (Izraelewicz, 1994)
has already been experienced in the air transport industry (such as with United Parcel
Service). If it happens to be successful, lots of airlines among which Air France will be
tempted to follow the same path.
The relative power of airline workers and their management varies a lot according to
context in which the airline operates. One extreme is Air France where employees can
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Average Wage and benefits un adjusted for inflation,
for all employees at US schedule airlines compared
with all US non farm worker
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dismiss the CEO by going in the street and the other extreme is Frank Lorenzo's numerous
ex-air carriers where unions were consistently clashed.
Fuel:
Fuel has historically accounted from 8 to 20% of a ticket cost. It is regarded as an
external factor, and the power is in neither hand: the price is externally fixed. However a
new issue has appeared when claims have been made on the fuel tax. Government can be
willing to exempt the air carriers from this tax to enable them to have a competitive
advantage over other carriers. Currently fuel in Europe is significantly higher than in the
States, giving a disadvantage to carriers with hub in Europe.
Air Traffic Control
This activity has been carried out traditionally by State agencies, mostly due to the
necessary coordination with the military air control. In the US, the role falls in the hands
of the FAA, in Europe each country has its own rules and sometimes its own system of
measure(See Annex 4).
The roles of the Air traffic Control are twofold:
· on the spot ensuring that there is no collision
· to regulate the flow of traffic so no sector becomes overcrowded.
These two tasks are carried out amazingly manually, with the air traffic controllers
making decisions in real time for the less than fifteen planes they have on their screen. The
help from the computer is still marginal.
The second task explains why one can be stuck in Amsterdam on his way to
Barcelona for traffic jam even though the runway is empty. The reason is that the sky
above Aix en Provence is forecast to be overcrowded by the time his plane arrives there.
(Aix en Provence has one of the busiest skies in summer time...) When forecasting such a
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problem the air traffic controllers phone the different airports to inform them of the
situation.
Recognizing the need to change the structure of ATC to improve its efficiency,
several options have been proposed. The first one named "ICARE" aims to give much
more control to the pilot. He will be responsible for most of the decisions regarding
passing over. He will be helped by the latest technological advances in terms of radar and
avionics. The second solution is to give the entire power to the ground staff. The planes
will respond automatically to their orders, no pilot will be needed for the routine
operations.
In the short term, privatization may help to increase the efficiency as well as
accelerate the homogenization within the European Union and later on, between the EU and
the US.
Aiorts
Airports are supposed to be one of the major constraints in the future airline
industry. They are already heavily congested in Europe (see Annex 4) and are near
saturation in the US. The last airport to have been built in the US is the new Denver airport
that was promoted by the present Secretary of Transport, former city mayor of this town.
In Europe a project exists in Athens but is far from completion.
Airports are being funded both by the airlines and the passengers:
* the passengers pay a ticket tax for the use of the airport, this one is fixed by the airport
within a certain range.
* the airlines pay the landing fee for each of their landing or taking off. Its price system is
somehow awkward, proportional to the weight of the plane - and not to the congestion
provoked by the usage of the runway -. As seen in the LA case where the airport has
tremendously increased its landing fees, little can be do against an airport's decision.
However these landing fees can be a competitive tool to attract airlines.
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Slots have usually been inherited by airlines as grandfather rights - slots are
virtually part the airline companies assets -. New slots are attributed by the airport
authority. As the level of concentration increased, some airports have been increasingly
linked to dominant carriers. This has been always true in Europe where national airports
and flag carriers are closely related.
Substitutes
Surface Transportation
Cars or buses compete with planes on either very short haul (less than 200 km) or
on the back pack segment. However it is not regarded as a major threat even to short haul
services.
Trains however and particularly, high speed rails are a serious threat. The potential
impact of high speed services is optimum between 400 and 600 km. The future of the high
speed rail in the US is uncertain whereas it is supposed to be a major transportation means
in Europe (see ANNEX 4).
Telecommunication
If traveling by plane will constitute an hassle due to the over congestion during the
convenient times, traveling may become less fashionable (whatever they say, business
travelers tend to like their time spent abroad), then telecommunication may turn out to be a
good substitute for air travelers. We are supposed to be at an edge of the development of
telecommunication. However most of the new instruments will remain in the short run intra
firms and will not replace the actual negotiations and client meeting where the physical
presence of both parties will remain necessary for a while. Furthermore, these new
techniques will certainly encourage the firms to develop more internationally and thus
increasing the need for air trips.
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ANNEX 3: American Deregulation: the origin
Numerous books have been written and yet the total results of the American
deregulation are unclear. Quoting Alfred E Khan, the mastermind of the deregulation, in a
recent interview(Velocci, 1993). "Clearly, some of my predictions have not been correct.
That's because I'm an academician, and I made the mistake of getting into the political
process. But on balance, I am proud of what I did." In the same trend the Brookings
Institution has launched a number of $6 billion that deregulation has saved to traveling
public. On the other hand, several books have been written against deregulation. One of the
last, and not the least virulent being "Airline Deregulation and Laissez Faire Mythology"
(Dempsey and Goetz, 1992). Speaking of the whole transport system: "Before
deregulation, our transportation system was universally acclaimed to be the world's finest.
Since then, the deterioration in our transportation infrastructure, public and private, would
embarrass a Third World nation. The potholes we dodge on the highways and the aging
jets in which we fly are symptoms of a malignant illness."
Amazingly, would say the opponents of deregulation, the airlines were first
regulated by the Kelly Act (1925) and the Civil Aeronautics Act (1938) to protect them
against destructive competition. In a simplistic manner, they would say "take away these
protections and here are we again with the destructive competition." The roles of the CAB
included:
· Determination of which carriers could provide service
· Which routes they could fly
· What fares they would charge for these services
· Responsibility for maintaining air safety standards
Carriers then in service were granted "grandfather certificates" on those routes they
then served. Afterwards, the CAB had complete control of any new or expanded service
(Bennewitz 1993).
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The Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act to transfer the safety responsibility
to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1958. The two kinds of regulations,
societal which organizes the way an industry operates and economical which regulates how
firms are competing among themselves were clearly separated. This very fact has simplified
the work of the congress in its move toward more and more functional regulation and less
and less economical regulations in the end of the seventies.
The CAB had really a heavy hand on the industry and was not rubber stamping all
the demands. In the last decade before 1978, the Board received 1500 route applications
and approved only 120 or 8% (US Congress, Report 95-631, 1978). The CAB also used
to deny the exit of city pairs that were supposed to be of public interest. Fares were also
controlled, that is the Board could impose an airline that was charging too high or too low
fares, to set reasonable fares, reasonable in the sense that they supposedly provide
sufficient revenue for the airline without robbing the customer. Finally the Board had a
close look on the competition, preventing mergers, or aggressive competition.
The system turned out to be highly inappropriate in the seventies and could not
cope with the increasing demand. As stated by Alfred Kahn, the CAB regulation had:
· caused air fares to be considerably higher than they otherwise would be;
· resulted in serious mis-allocation of resources
· encouraged carrier inefficiency
· denied consumers the range of price/service options they would prefer
· created a chronic tendency toward excess capacity
Air carriers owned inconsistent networks with a proportion of high profitable
routes with unprofitable ones. As they could not compete on fares, they competed on
service, providing unnecessary high level of service. Moreover, experiences in California
or in Texas in a more deregulated environment, (the Board had no power on intrastate
routes) proved that there was a demand for cheaper flights (Southwest for instance). In
addition to this empirical evidence, theoretical studies had shown that:
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* the air industry was no longer infant and did not need protection
* economies of scale were not sufficient to be afraid of a monopolistic situation
* destructive competition could appear in the short run but an equilibrium in the long
run
This, in turn has led to the now famous Aviation Deregulation Act of 1978 that
asked the Board to place "...maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual
and potential competition (A) to provide the needed air transportation system, and (B) to
encourage efficient and well managed carriers to earn adequate and to attract capital"
(Public Law 95.504 sec 102.a.4).
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ANNEX 4: Specificity of the European Market
Market
An association of countries vs. a nation
This difference remains very important. It has implication in the entire regulatory
order and thus in the industry itself. The European liberalization can only be an
international treaty signed by the members, it deals with bilateral or multilateral issues and
not only with pricing or routes award. Thus countries have their own point of view on
what should the eventual result of the liberalization. As a matter of fact two countries have
emerged as the major leaders: France and UK, each one trying to get the support of the rest
of the countries.
A highly concentrated place vs. an open space
The EFTA states cumulates 374 million inhabitants on 3.5 million square kilometers
whereas the USA has 255 million inhabitants spread over more than 9.3 million square
kilometers. This geographical fact added to the poor mobility of workers across Europe
makes the demand for air transport far less important in Europe than in the States, the
business segment and the FRV which account for 72% of the non business market are less
important.
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Players
A much more state controlled industry
Table A4. 1: The Eight major Players and their status regarding privatization as of 1993
Companies Percent Owned Future Prospects
by Government
Air France Group 90.2% On the list of the companies to be
privatized
Lufthansa 50.7% To be privatized as soon as possible
British Airways 0% Privatized in 1987
SAS 50%
Alitalia 81% Will be privatized along with its holding
IRI
Swissair 22% No change
KLM 39% The government wants to keep its shares
at this level
Iberia 100%
Source: Shearman (1992), Le Monde (1994),
As opposed to their American counterparts even before the deregulation, the
European airlines are all except British Airways, more or less publicly owned.
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Supliers
Labor
The labor productivity in Europe is much lower than in the states:
Table A4.2. Labor Productivity and Costs in the US and in Europe
Analysis of European versus US labour costs and productivity
US European Percentage
Airlines Airlines Cha
Financial Measurements (US
Gross salaries per employee 40,353 44,493 -10.26%
Social charges per employee 1 1,722 1 0,573 9.80%
Total Labour Cost 52,257 55,066 -5.38%
Total Labour Cost per ATK (cents) 15.55 21.27 -36.78%
Social costs as percentage of total 22% 19% 14.40%
Physical Productivity
ATKs per Employee 336,01 9 258,908 22.95%
Departure per employee 13.24 6.28 52.57%
Blosck Hours per Employee 27.15 12.98 52.19%
Source Avmark
European carriers have a competitive disadvantage as opposed to the American
carriers. However, the competitive disadvantage is mostly due to a difference in
productivity more than a difference in wages or social charges (Social charges are actually
higher in the US). Therefore, it is up to the European companies to fill the gap by adopting
more efficient structures and more flexible rules.
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Air Traffic Control
Table A4.3: International Short and Medium Haul Flights Delayed more then 15 Minutes
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Air Traffic control in Europe is run from 52 different centers. Some of these
systems are not linked to each other, which create lots of inefficiencies which, in turn, are
responsible for number of delays (see table A4.2) and an extra cost for the carriers. The
"Comite des Sages" has asked for a profound reform of the system and the creation of a
single unified system in Europe.
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Airports
Table A4.4 European Airport Congestion bv Year 2000
Source: SRI International Report for LATA, 1991
Airports in Europe are especially congested. Without enhancements, 16 airports
will be capacity constraints by year 2000. Because of the nimby syndrome (not in my back
yard), new constructions are not expected to arise. Secondary airports may become more
and more important. however congestion will increase steadily.
As congestion increases in most of the airports, pressure for more efficiency will
also increase. That means pressure for bigger planes -revising the price structure -,
organizational improvements - which may or may not need a form of privatization.
However the least congested airports as CDG - will have a chance to play an increasing
role.
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Substitutes
Surface Transportation
High-speed rail is on the top of the European agenda. It has been clearly recognized
as the future trans European means of transport with an ambitious scheme for the
development of its network:
Figure A4. 1: EC Plan for high-speed rail network
Source: Financial Times Supplement, August 1991
Examples in France have shown the expected impact: on the Paris - Lyon liaison
the TGV has taken approximately 40 % of the air traffic (Reed, 1993). "The 'Chunnel'
train operators envision taking 70% of passenger traffic from the airlines on the London-
Brussels-Paris route" (Reed, 1993). The reason of the competitive advantage of the train
vis-A-vis airlines are mainly rooted in the subsidies that trains are receiving from the States.
However, as previously stated, there is a clear political consensus in Europe to promote the
usage of trains. They will therefore be continuously subsided for a long period.
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ANNEX 5: European Three Packages
Legislation Adopted before 1987
Air Transport was specifically excluded from the common transport policy (see
Article 84 of the Rome Treaty). Even as regard to the competition rules, air transport was
deliberately omitted until mid-1980's. The sector was regulated by bilateral agreements
Chicago, Bermuda I and II, and the EC itself have not played any role.
At about the same time as the US in the 70s, Europe went through the exercise of
evaluating the premium that passengers have to pay due to this regulatory environment, it
came up with an average of 10%. In 1979 the commission initiated a wide-ranging debate
leading to the approval of a few directives:
· Cooperation and mutual assistance in air accident investigation
* Noise emissions from subsonic aircraft
· Relations between member states and third countries
· Carriage of express law weight cargo by air
· Inter - Regional air services
In 1984 however, the Commission submitted a second Memorandum on civil
aviation that set up the main lines along which all the European liberalization was going to
take place:
· improvement of the competition inside the EC, leaving until later the problems of
improving links with third countries
* control of State aids to company
* development of air freight
* harmonization of charter transport
In this report the Commission decided not to follow the American deregulation
model. Note that it was long before all the controversy on the American experience.
Finally in 1986, the European Court of Justice in the now famous "Nouvelles
Frontieres" case confirmed the application to air transport, of the rules on competition of
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the Rome Treaty (Articles 85 and 86) and specified the procedures for their implementation
in the absence of an implementing Regulation.
Legislation Adopted After 1987
The "Nouvelles Frontieres" case is usually considered as the starting point of the
European liberalization of air transport. Although it has had a tremendous psychological
and public impact, the future of liberalization was unsure until December 1987 when the
council adopted the first package of Commission proposals for air transport liberalization.
From this date on, new legislation-will be continuously adopted by the Council.
They can be divided into two broad categories:
* operations rules
· competition rules
(a) Operation rules
* Air Traffic Congestion: Creation of EUROCONROL to replace the eight systems
presently operating in the EC so as to increase the efficiency of the ATC and prevent
congestion (see chapter on ATC)
* Aircraft Noise Emission Limitation: to ban progressively all the aircraft which do not
comply with the standards set out under chapter 3 of the Chicago Convention on Civil
Aviation
* International air transport negotiations: The Commission introduced a proposal in 1990
to transfer the competence for negotiating air transport agreements with third countries
from individual member States to the European Commission. This process should
strengthen EC airlines negotiating position on routes in third countries. Some
transitional periods have been set up such as the obligation for the Member States to
submit their negotiated bilateral agreements before signing them for approval.
69
· Personnel licenses: To increase the efficiency and improve the labor mobility, the
Member States have been required to recognize licenses issued in other Member States.
* Working conditions of airline crews: Their harmonization is all the more important to
ensure common safety standards and fare competition between carriers
* Over-booking: Common rules are also necessary to ensure proper competition
* Aircraft safety and technical standards
* Aircraft accidents and incidents
(b) Competition
The "Nouvelles Frontieres" case opened a new era of competition within the air
industry in Europe. In 1987, the Community adopted the first package which mainly
concerns:
· relaxation of the rules governing fares: The abolition of the restrictions on cheap
promotional fares and the introduction of a Community arbitration procedure facilitating
the variation of prices without the consent of competitors
· greater freedom as for capacity sharing (the prevailing rule was a fifty-fifty share)
· greater access to routes: recognition of the fifth freedom, cabotage was postponed until
1993 (eventually it has been postponed till April 1, 1997)
· procedure for applying Community competition rules to air transport
In 1988, new competition regulations were adopted concerning:
· commercial agreements between airlines
· computer reservation systems
· ground facilities
In April 1989, the liberalization process was confirmed by the European Court of
Justice in the "Saeed" case. confirming the "Nouvelles Frontieres" case, this decision
applied the competition rules to the new Community provisions resulting from the
implementation of the first liberalization package.
70
"In July 1989, the commission reached consensus on the second phase of deregulation.
this stage was designed to build on achievement secured during the first phase of
liberalization in 1987 and was aimed specifically at encouraging cheaper air fares and at
increasing the pressure on Europe's airline cartels." (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994)
Finally in July 1992 the third and last package of air transport measures was
adopted. It is supposed to put an end to the process of liberalization now completed.
However it has postponed the right of cabotage until April 1, 1997. At this time the
implementation will have come to an end. The third package establishes rules regarding
operating licenses, route access and fare pricing detailed below.
The current rules as January 1, 1993
In this last paragraph are summarized the current rules regarding some specific aspects of
the competition:
(a) Fares
"· Member States may request air carriers to file their new air fares 24 hours (including a
working day) before they are due to come into effect. If the fare is to match an existing
fare, only prior notification is required
* Until April 1997 fares, on routes where competition is limited i.e. where the route is
operated by only one carrier or two carriers under a joint agreement, will have to be
filed at least one working day but less than one month before they come into effect
· The system of "double disapproval" was extended to all fares from January 1993. A
new fare submitted by an air carrier will be authorized unless both the Member States of
departure and arrival disapprove it. the Commission will intervene where a member
State opposes a fare change one route." (Coopers and Lybrand)
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(b) Access to Service Routes
· Fifth freedom rights are granted to any Community air carriers within the community
with no restrictions
· No capacity sharing on routes between Member States
· the authorization of cabotage will be delivered to all carriers, April 1, 1997
(c) Slot Allocation at Airports
A fairly comprehensive regulation was adopted on December 7, 1992 to prevail
until June 30, 1998. It is designed to increase competition between airlines and open up
congested airports. The procedure is as follows:
· A pool is created with all the vacant slots - newly created, surrendered by airlines or
under utilized (less than 80% of utilization) -
* half of the pool is earmarked for new entrants i.e. with less than four slots a day
* if the pool is not sufficient, the airport authority can force airlines using small planes
(less than more 200 seats) and with more than six slots a day to divest these slots
· slots awarded to new entrants may not be exchanged between carriers for two seasons
to prevent larger airlines to buy them
* a Member State can prevent another State airline to increase its flights if the contrary is
not possible
(d) Joint Planning and Coordination of Schedules
These measures are prevailing until June 30, 1998:
· airlines can coordinate schedules to provide services during off-peak hours or to
improve connection times
* a smaller airline can receive marketing and financial support from another airline with
restrictions on time, capacity, networks...
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(e) Tariff Consultation
They are allowed until June 30, 1998 on several conditions such as:
* they concern only airfares and not the capacity for which those fares are available
* they are open to any airline serving the route and the concerned Member States and not
binding
* a report is submitted to the Commission
(f) Computer Reservation System (CRS)
A code of conduct was adopted in July 1989 and slightly amended in November
1993. This code applies to all CRS operating in the EC regardless of their status or
nationality. Here what it says:
· a system vendor must allow any carrier to participate on a non-discriminatory basis and
for a reasonable fee within the capacity of the system
· a system vendor may not manipulate data provided by the carriers in a discriminatory
way, the display should be clear and also non discriminatory
· these rules do not apply for third carriers in the case they are not respecting them in
their home countries'
· joint agreements are allowed - with restrictions - to develop CRS even though it could
have adverse effect on competition
(g) Ground Handling Services
The Commission initiated a wide ranging consultation procedure on stopover
services in airports in the European Union with a view of total liberalization. Currently, the
ground handling facilities is still monopolistic in most airports with charges varying a lot.
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(h) Liberalization of air Freight
Fifth freedom is granted to Community Carriers within the community and to third
carriers if community carriers have the same right in this carrier's home base. Nothing is
agreed as for cabotage rights. Fares are by in large free as well as route access.
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ANNEX 6: Major Players in the European Market
British Airways
Nicknamed "Bloody Awful" at the beginning of the 80s, British Airways turned out
to be one of the most profitable airline in 1992, with a consistent worldwide network and a
solid anchor in the United States. This growth was mainly external with acquisitions of
British Caledonian, Dan Air as well as equity in USAir, TAT.
Two managers have to be given credit for this enormous transformation John King,
later Lord King of Wartnaby. He was appointed as CEO by Margaret Thatcher in 1982 in
order to clean up the company before its privatization. He later appointed Sir Colin
Marshall as chief executive in 1983 who brought its long experience in service industry
acquired with Hertz and Avis.
BA was created by the mergers of BEA (British European Airways) and BOAC
(British Overseas Airways Corporation) in 1974. Through the seventies it has enjoyed the
easy life of a flag carrier, governmentally owned with no commercial driving forces...
To complete its clean up task, John King decided to make a revolution:
* sells 50 planes
* ceased 62 unprofitable routes
* reduced the number of staff from 53,000 in 1981 to 36,000 in 1984
* replace old administrators by new comers from the industry
* launch an aggressive marketing campaign and a new concept (the Business class)
The results almost immediately improved from a loss of almost $ 200 million in
1981, it goes to a profit of a $ 150 million the year after and more than $ 300 million in
1983. Since then the results are impressive, regarding the market share, the turnover or the
net incomes.
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Table A6.1 British Airways' Revenues and Results 1988 - 1992 (in £ million)
Revenue
4838 4937 5224
I I Q
-L~ I. .- I -I
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Net Result before Tax
345
268
228
L
-1-
285
130
1
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Source: Le Figaro (1993)
This growth has been sustained through a reduction cost plan launched in 1991 -
the gap closure - . £ 150 million have been saved in 1991 and another £ 150 million in
1992. 5000 jobs have been cut, productivity was increased by 12% in 991 and 22% in the
first 1992 semester. Unit cost have been decreased by 7.4%.
Strategy
To become a global company in a deregulated world through a vast network of
alliances, to take full advantage of the competitive advantages it enjoys:
1987 acquisition of British Caledonian Airways
1988 acquisition of Dan Air
1989 enters into contact with United Airlines, no success
creates Sabena World Airlines with KLM and Sabena, this poll with an interesting
hub in Brussels, has been dismantled by the EC in December 1990 for antitrust
reasons (with Air France stepping in)
1990 failure with Interflug (East Germany) and German Wings (West Germany)
1991 no success whatsoever with Sabena and Air New Zealand
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1992 failure with KLM
creation with Aeroflot of "Air Russia", the new flag carrier of the new Russia
participation in USAir
acquisition of Delta Air (Germany) renamed Deutsche BA
participation (49.9%) in TAT European Airlines
acquisition of 25 % of Qantas
The Strategic Position of BA in the Different market
UK
Controls the UK market, has more than 40% of the slots in Heathrow, 90% of the
London - Paris route ( among the UK companies). Other companies are:
· Virgin Atlantic in the North Atlantic market (its CEO regularly announces the creation
on Virgin European Airways to operate on the European routes).
* British Midland An active company in Europe (mostly central Europe), owned at
24.9% by SAS
* Air UK owned at 15% by KLM
European Union
BA tries heavily to establish itself on the Continent. However since the dismantled
of the Sabena World Airways, its presence is still relatively weak. Deutsche BA managed
to make Germany BA's third market with a big grasp on London - Frankfurt and TAT
controls 3.8 % of the domestic traffic in France.
The European Commission has hampered the growth of BA on the Continent
putting restrictions to acquisition such divestment of some rights on certain routes (for
instance Gatwick Paris when purchasing British Caledonian). BA still holds 52.2% of the
London - Paris (1992) as compared to 32.9 % for Air France.
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Eastern Europe
BA has taken the riskiest choice by investing with the dying Aeroflot, the risks are:
· commercial, a failure
· political, BA can be expropriated
This joint venture can however turn out to be a great strategic move if the Russian
market boom and eastern Europe recovers in a peaceful manner.
North Atlantic market
This market is BA first market representing one third of its operating profits.
However it faces an increasing competition from the American Airlines (7 have landing
slots in Heathrow). To counter them BA acquired 21% of the voting rights of USAir. This
alliance is one of the best possible for BA (or any European carrier). Despite its current
problems, USAir is still the fourth domestic air carrier in the States serving more than 200
towns in the US with hubs at Charlotte, Pittsburgh. Although these are not very convenient
gateways for the North Atlantic market, USAir can still feed most of the BA planes,
besides USAir has very few international routes thus preventing any internal competition in
the alliance.
This possible merger is fought by American, United and Delta. These companies
also lobby for an open sky between the two countries before the merger be authorized and a
fairer competition at the Heathrow Airport where BA has taken all the good slots. On the
other side, the two mergimg airlines threat to acquire only Airbus aircraft if the American
government does not allow their merger.
Asia
British Airways has recently acquired 25% of Qantas, which gives it a foothold in
the Pacific Rim. Results of this alliance are still uncertain.
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Lufthansa
Presentation
The German publicly owned (51.6%) company is second by revenue to Air France
in Europe. In 1991, it posted its first loss in 20 years - $315 million - (Velocci, 1993). Its
newly appointed chairman Jtirgen Weber has vowed to return Lufthansa to profitability in
1995, at the latest. (Velocci, 1994). Its early successes have provided an example for Air
France management as a way to operate a reorganization.
Table A6.2: Lufthansa Results 1989 - 1993 (FFr million)
.
Source: Alberganti (1993)
The main actions undertaken to achieve this result were:
· implementation of a new corporate culture
* 15% cut in the work force (that is 8 000 positions), to be completed at the end of 1994
· wage freeze in 1993, 2.7 % increase in 1994 plus a one time premium of 1 000 Marks
in January 1994
· change in the organization structure with fewer levels
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Lufthansa Net Income (Before Tax)
I AAA
1 UUU
500
O
-500
-1000
-1500
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
(estimated)
* fewer expatriations.
International Strategy
In Europe, Lufthansa has acquired some shares of Luxair, giving it partial control
of Cargolux the first European freight carrier. A long time allied of Air France, it has 49%
of their joint venture Euroberlin. A joint venture should also have been signed between
their two Hotel Chains (Meridien, Kempinski). No agreement has been signed and
Lufthansa finally sold its chain as part of its plan -Air France is in the process of doing so-.
Recently the relations between the two carriers have deteriorated with Lufthansa launching
an unexpected war fare in January 1993 and turning to new allies such as Austrian.
On the North Atlantic market, Lufthansa has finally chosen its US partner, United
Airlines. This will provide Lufthansa access to the large US domestic market. On the other
hand, conflict of interests may rise between the two partners as United Airline has a strong
commitment in the North Atlantic market.
In the Pacific Rim, no formal alliances have been passed between Lufthansa and
any Asian carriers. However, talks with JAL and Garuda have been held.
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KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
KLM is still a public company with 38.2% of its stakes publicly owned. The very
recent capital increase has not changed the equilibrium since the State has acquired some of
the shares. KLM is second to BA in Europe in efficiency (see p29) and is often regarded as
a BA follower. In 1989 it has formed an alliance with British Airways and Sabena to create
Sabena World Airways, this combination was eventually broken up by the Commission the
31 December 1990. In 1992 another unsuccessful attempt with BA has occurred.
However, its strategy very much looks like BA's:
(a) to control the domestic market KLM acquired 80% of Transavia, 30% of Martinair
and 40% of ALM.
(b) to get a foothold in the other European Markets. For that purpose KLM acquired
15% of Air UK and Air Littoral in France (it has eventually decided to get rid of its stakes
in Air Littoral as the company was making losses corresponding to one quarter of its
revenues)
(c) to pass an agreement with one of the major US companies. KLM has 20% of
Wings Holding which owns Northwest Airlines. This agreement is regarded as the tightest
one between two companies of this size. It concerns a wide range of subject from code
sharing, marketing to joint maintenance. The original point is the open sky agreement
between the States and Holland. This open sky agreement enables KLM to fly anywhere in
the States, but does not grant it with cabotage rights. Similarly, US carriers can fly
anywhere in Netherlands. As BA with USAir, KLM loses lots of money in the operation
so far, as Northwest has consistently lost some money over the last few years- KLM has
stated that its all investment has been swallowed-. However, the agreement is regarded by
the experts as a model of what could be done in the future.
This BA-like strategy changed in 1993. At this time, Europe saw slowly the
prospective of a fourth mega carrier named Alcazar after a fortress in Spain with four
dominant towers. This joint venture should have boosted SAS, Swissair, Austrian and
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KLM. Alcazar was not a "natural step" for KLM whose strategy was clearly not to build a
global European carrier. KLM was therefore not ready to make any concession to the other
partners. As stated by Bouw, KLM was taking part of the talk "without our backs to the
wall" (Reed, 1994). The project has been quite far in terms of joint operations, but it has
failed when it counters KLM's overall strategy. After this failure KLM went on with its
previous strategy.
KLM seems to be willing to increase its share market in freight, it has some
agreements with Nippon Cargo Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Garuda Indonesia on that
matter. Northwest is also particularly active in this business too. Therefore KLM has
bought a convertible Boeing 747, has extended its freight zone at Schiphol and has
increased its handling capacity to 1 million of tons.
Last but not least, KLM has a strong competitive advantage given by Schiphol one
of the few unsaturated airports in Europe and whose growing importance will serve the
interests of KLM.
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ANNEX 7: French Market
Domestic
The major domestic market in Europe:
Table A7.1. Domestic Schedule Traffic (199 
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Table A7.2. Passen2er Traffic from Paris / Frankfurt / London (1991)
Source: Civil Aviation / ITA Data Base (1993)
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France has the major domestic market in Europe. This market is entirely dominated
by Air Inter with regional airlines playing only a minor role. However this market is
threatened by the increasing market share of the TGV. This phenomenon has been studied
for the European market as the high speed rail network is supposed to spread over Europe
very rapidly. Some markets such as Paris Strasbourg will completely disappear. France
will still have some of the major routes in Europe such as Paris - Nice, more than 2.5
million passengers in 1991 or Paris Marseilles with 2 million. For those routes the high
speed train is less a threat as the distance between the cities exceeds 700 kilometers. These
routes have been recently opened to competition and there still some struggles on the
subject and the harsh way used by Air Inter to prevent those entries (often wished by the
people of the cities) show the potential threat that they constitute.
France - Europe
Table A7.3. Passenger Schedule Traffic between France. Germany and UK and their Five
Major Partners
Source: ITA 1993
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The traffic between France and the rest of Europe as shown by table A7.4 and A7.5
is characterized by:
* A schedule traffic in line with the major European countries
· A very small leisure segment
The very small leisure segment is consistent with the fact that France is a supplier in
terms of vacation sites and French people do not travel abroad for their vacation. In terms
of total traffic Spain is the first destination both for German and English people.
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Table A7.4: Major OD Markets outside Europe from France. Germany and the UK.
Source: ITA 1993
Table A7.5 Major OD Markets outside Europe from Paris. Frankfurt. London
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The traffic between France and the rest of the world (note that Point a Pitre and Fort
de France is counted as domestic traffic) is characterized by:
· an overall traffic far smaller than the UK
* some specific destinations (North Africa, French territories)
* an overlapping market with Germany and the UK on the North Atlantic (US and
Canada) and to a lesser extent to Japan (Tokyo). In each of this three markets, the
British have the biggest share.
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ANNEX 8: Air France Group
A general presentation
Air France is a huge group, ranking third among airlines by revenue in 1993. 20%
of its activities are non core activities ranging from catering to a flying school.
Figure A8. 1 : Consolidated Turnover According to Activity in 1992
2%2%
6%
604
12%
Source: Air France Annual Report (1992)
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I Cargo Operations
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* Leisure Travel
E Handling for Other Airlines
] Catering and Other Services
* Chartering
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i%
Maior Companies of Air France Group
Air France: The main company whose focus is in the medium or long haul fight
primarily in the international arena (the only domestic flights of Air France
are routes to the French overseas territories)
UTA: i Former main Air France competitor with focus on Africa and Tahiti (via Los
Angeles), has been taken over by Air France in 1990 and finally merged
with it on December 29, 1992. (Although formally UTA took over Air
France and then was renamed Air France)
Air Inter. The French domestic carrier also taken over by Air France in 1990, as a
result of the take over of UTA, moves towards a European carrier
specialized in medium haul as competition and the TGV pushes it out of the
French domestic market.
Air Charter: Air France charter's company focuses primarily on medium-haul operation
(Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia...) It has to compete against lower cost
charters
Euroberlin: Joint Venture with Lufthansa (51% Air France - 49% Lufthansa) serves
primarily Berlin to inner cities of Germany, its future is uncertain due to
Lufthansa stepping in its market
Meridien: Managed 58 luxury hotels all over the world, rumors announce its
imminent sale to raise cash
Sotair: Tour Operator offering leisure travel products under the brand names Jet
Tours, Eldorador, Jumbo Kit and Jumbo Charter. In the near future, it
should regroup all its activities under its main brand name - Jet Tour -.
Servair: Catering, has a wide range activities from airline or train catering to the
famous "Fromages Androuet" -the most luxury cheese seller in Paris-.
Every activity that is not directly related to air transport could be sold.
89
Table A8.2:
Airline Operations
Total operating income amounted for FFr 45,343 million in 1992 decomposed as follows:
Table A8.2: Breakdown of Passenger Traffic Turnover (1992)
Source: Air France Annual Report (1992)
Air France and Air Inter are the two dominant components of Air France Group air
transport operations sharing the turnover on a 3/4 - 1/4 basis.
Financial Result
1993 results for the group are expected to be extremely bad with a loss of FFr 7.5
billion ($1.3 billion) after its FFr 3.7 billion loss in 1992 and FFr 2 billion deficit in 1991.
Moreover it has a debt of FFr 36 billion ($6.1 billion). The carrier is said to spent FFr 117
for every FFr 100 earned on the North Atlantic market, in Europe FFr 110, Asia FFr 108,
and South America FFr 111 (Gallacher 1994). Air France Group revenues are not covering
its pay roll nor the interest expenses. No results were shown for Air France airline only in
1992 as the merger of UTA and Air France which has taken place October 1st, 1992 has
split the year into two preventing any consolidation.
90
o Air France
* AirInter
9 Air Charter
Euroberlin
2% 1%
2L96 ,
:;:;:;f:;:;:;: :::::::::::·· ''.5'.'.'''''''" C·l
:::::::::::::x jri851
s 
,,·.·
  iiji,
ri"Q :::::.i:':'!:,,x:_o: I:·::::::
" s::::: :.::·:·::5·:,:::::::t;:.:55;:;:;
Sff·;·;·:·;·;S 
:555 R ·5·; ;s·;-·-- n:::::::;::':.':
::::::I;··::::::::r :··:···:;;:a g:::::·:·""" x::s·.:.:.:::M·:s:'':'::;2;
:::::W:::::.s::::: :':'::::::f;S'''''::::::::::,
::::: .·. :::·:S·2·.·..s
iii .·::::::::::::::  :::::,.,,·r:::s::: 
.:5 
::::::;:;:;:::::::::::.  r.r
s  2:S
s  r , f
sss "" fifi
s; ::s:::;;:;:::::::::8:
::::::::::..,s:..:.:::::: ti :Xs ;33 ·:::;:;:1:::;:;::::::::
i :sss;i · :
::::::::::·::::s:::::::: ::::::::;::::i·;::is·:·:·s:::::::·:. z.. .:.·..·.
73%
Air France (alone)
Traffic
Table A8.3: Air France Traffic by RPK (1992)
Source: Air France Annual Report (1992)
Table A8.4: Air France Traffic in Passengers (1992)
Source: Air France Annual Report 1992
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Europe is the major market by far in terms of passengers but as for the RPK7 the
traffic is much more evenly split between the main markets (North America being the leader
with 21% followed by Asia (20%) and Africa (18%)). Note the importance of the West
Indies Market for Air France, this lucrative market can be lost to low cost entries. Taking
into account the fact that the Asian market is booming whereas the African market
stagnates, Air France will have to put more and more pressure on the Asian market. As
average stage length for this market is the highest (8 311 Km), it is the most vulnerable
market against "Sixth Freedom" carriers.
Analysis of the North American market
Table A8.5: Market Share of the European Carriers from the US to Europe
100
Otn 
I* 1991
* 60
W
as
40
France Belgium Germany Italy UK Switzerland Netherlands
Source: ITA 1993
Analyzing the share of the European carrier in its main market - towards North
America - Air France appears to have the lowest share. This is due to:
the former liberal agreement between France and the US allowing the US carrier to
have whatever traffic they want (as opposed to the more strict agreement between the
7 RPK = Revenue Passenger Kilometer - number of passenger * number of kilometers flown per
passenger.
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US and UK). However this agreement has been abrogated in 1993 by Paris and now
each change has to be negotiated on a reciprocity basis.
a competitive disadvantage of Air France with higher costs than the US carriers.
Air Inter
Market
Table A8.6: Air Inter Traffic in Passengers
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The traffic of Air Inter is mainly radial to and from Paris. In Paris, it used to operate
only at Orly airport but as of 1993, has moved some of its flights to Roissy to increase the
connections between the two airlines.
Connections with Air France
Main Stake holders of Air Inter.
Air France
SNCF
72.34%
12.32%
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Air France took control of Air Inter while taking over UTA. Before that both
airlines had minority interests in Air Inter. However there has never been a real synergy
between the two airlines. This is due to:
· the poor connections between their main airports in Paris
· their markets are different and not complementary up to now
· two different corporate cultures
For those reasons Bernard Attali has been often criticized for having taken over Air
Inter. As for the future two interesting recent moves may well be premonitories. Air France
now serves Paris (CDG) - Nice and Air Inter has an increasing number of European routes
(a 50% growth between 1991 and 1992) such as Paris Ibiza, Paris Venice, Paris
Brussels...The two markets will soon overlap creating sources of conflict. On the other
hand Air Inter is increasing is presence at CDG (+17.3% passengers in 1993) which could
mean tighter links with Air France.
What is going on ?
The present situation of Air France must be faced. Christian Blanc unveiled his
restructuring plan on March 12, 1994. It calls for FFr 20 billion in State Aid which would
be given in three tranches. The first one to be received as soon as the unions have approved
the plan, the two subsequent will be closely related to the success of the restructuring plan.
This plan asks for a 30% increase of the productivity mainly achieved through
organizational improvements, wage freezes and layoffs. It also proposes to sell part of Air
France capital in exchange for labor concessions. This plan first met the labor unions'
disapproval but received more than 80% of the votes in a referendum that took place in the
first week of April.
The plan will have to be approved by the European commission before being
implemented. Strong opposition is expected from BA, KLM and to a lesser extent from
Lufthansa. The most likely outcome is that Brussels will scale down the aid and impose
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some restrictions on the future move of Air France to ensure that this aid will not distort the
market. The effect on Air France will then be ambiguous. It will certainly help it survive
but may have two adverse effects:
· it may delay the necessary measures and by pulling it out from a desperate position will
diminish the ability by the management to take drastic measures
· it may diminish the ability of Air France to compete with the other European Airlines as
it will be denied certain rights, certainly the right to control its domestic market.
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